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RESTRICTED

THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE MERCHANT MARINE
TO
NATIONAL POWER
A lecture delivered by
Commander George D. Synon, U. S. C. G.

at the Naval War College
September 12, 1949

In considering the relation of the Merchant Marine to na
tional power, it is perhaps automatic for members of the Armed
Forces to regard a large fleet of commercial shipping as indis
pensible to the security of the United States. This premise has
been fundamental to American naval strategy ever since Mahan
enunciated his concept of sea power toward the end of the last
century. It is today a proposition that is widely supported by
many outstanding figures who write and speak publicly on this
subject.
Here, at the War College, however, we must not fall into
the error of accepting any dogma or doctrine simply because it
has been demonstrated in the past to be sound or well-conceived.
It is necessary, rather, constantly to re-appraise in the light of
changing world conditions any and all of the strategic premises upon
which our thinking may tend to become fixed.
Especially is this so in the case of the Merchant Marine.
In the United States, private industry has been unable to operate
ocean shipping on any wide scale without financial assistance from
the Government. We call this subsidy; and we justify the payment
of subsidy on the ground that the Merchant Marine is essential to
economic prosperity and for the national defense. Consequently,
the support of a large fleet of commercial shipping has come to be
Commander Synon is a member of the Naval War College Staff.
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accepted in the United States as a proper function of government.
This viewpoint is vigorously and sincerely supported by the great
majority of individuals and organizations connected with the mari
time industry. But there are many people who believe that an ex
panded Merchant Marine may be contrary to the best interests of
the United States at the present time. These · persons are, of
course, in the minority, but their arguments deserve careful scrut
iny at an institution such as the War College. One ·of the pur
poses of this discussion is to present that contrary point of
view. Many of you officers here may at some time in the future
be called upon to make decisions touching on the Merchant Marine.
You will be helped in arriving at these decisions by a knowledge
not only of the many good arguments both for and against a
strong U. S. Merchant Marine, but also by those which may be

frankly designed to influence public opinion.

As an example of what I am talking about, let me recall to
your mind the state of the American Merchant Marine prior to

World War I and II. At the beginning of the first World War,
we had very little ocean shipping. Other nations carried the major
part of our foreign commerce. When we finally got into that War,

we simply did not have the ships we needed. Our troops and the
vast bulk of our munitions had to be transported overseas in the
ships of our allies. In World War II, we were in somewhat better
shape-particularly as to shipbuilding-but from the standpoint of
available tonnage, we were as poorly prepared to wage global war
in 1941 as we were in 1917.

The backers of a strong Merchant Marine policy point to
these two instances of unpreparedness as over-riding reason for us
to support an expanded fleet of merchant shipping in the future.

And yet, a pretty good case can be made out for the prop
osition that if the United States had been supporting such a mer
chant fleet, the Allies would probably have lost World War I and
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could not have won World War IL I shall attempt to do so a little

later in this discussion.

In the meantime, however, let us take a brief glance at
national power in its broadest sense, and determine, if we can, how

merchant shipping, as a part of sea power, has contributed to the
national greatness and prosperity of maritime states in the past.
Against such a background, I shall attempt to relate merchant

shipping to certain aspects of military strategy as it has historically
been employed in the case of Great Britain, since that nation dis
plays so many features that are strategically similar to our own.
Then, turning. to the present, we may consider a number of factors
brought about as a result of World War II which, in my opinion,
require a revision in our traditional concept-to some degree of sea
power-but more precisely, of the function of the Merchant Marine.
These factors are intimately related to the economics of world trade,
without some knowledge of which it is difficult to understand the
shipping situation as it exists today. And finally, a few conclusions,
which may be justified by prevailing world conditions and our
strategic needs for the future.
Character of National Power
The nations of the world have been broadly classified as con
tinental and maritime powers. Many military historians agree
that the character of a nation from this standpoint dictates the
form of strategy that is best suited to it. The British, for ex
ample, are a maritime people, and they have, with success, pursued
a maritime strategy. The Germans, on the other hand, are a con
tinental power, and their important military successes have been
on land. Mind you, this is not to say that a single nation may
not combine in itself certain elements of both sea and land power.

It is simply that such influences as geography, natural resources,
population, and so forth, serve to direct the interests of a people
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primarily toward the land, or toward the sea. If these forces are
recognized and understood, it is possible, in my opinion, to measure
the dependence of a state upon overseas trade, and thus to de
termine a maritime strategy best suited to preserve or increase
the national power.
If we examine the nations of Europe and Asia and arrange
them according to their historical pattern as continental or mari
time powers, we will observe one significant difference between the

two groups. All of the maritime powers-save Great Britain
seem at some time in their history to have risen to world leader
ship as sea powers, and then to have passed into decline-never to

recover sea power once it has been lost. Whether Great Britain is
now moving toward the fringes of that pattern, it is as yet too
soon to say. But not so the continental powers. The great land
powers-Russia, France, Germany-have lost and have regained

the dominant position in Europe on numerous occasions. Even
during periods of decline, they possess their political significance
-as an example, we have the case of Spain today-as opposed to
the almost complete loss of influence in world affairs suffered by

the small nations that border on the sea-of whom Portugal is
likewise a case in point.

The reason for this political phenomenon is, I believe, that
continental powers retain the essential attributes of territory, ma
terial resources, manpower-which cannot be taken from them

whereas, a truly maritime power can compensate itself for the

lack of these advantages only by remaining strong at sea, and sea
power-for reasons that are not clear-does not renew itself.

It seems fair to say, then, that if the independent nations of

the world who are truly maritime in character are forced away

from the sea-whether by economic competition they cannot meet,
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or by political or military means, their influence in world affairs
and, correspondingly, their capacity to defend their independence,
will be markedly reduced. This is the situation confronting the
smaller maritime powers today.
Merchant Shipping and Maritime Power

Now, what is the connection between merchant shipping and
the rise and fall of maritime states?
The Mediterranean basin is perhaps the most fruitful area
for an investigation of this sort. It is the scene of the emergence
of a succession of maritime powers throughout the span of re
corded history. Morever, the course of warfare in Europe has
been inseparably identified with sea power in the Mediterranean.
Naval strength has been exerted in these narrow waters almost
invariably in either of two forms: in the protection of maritime
commerce or in the employment of naval and merchant ship types
for the support of land armies. It is significant that the changes
in weapons and methods of warfare that have taken place since
many centuries before the birth of Christ have failed to alter the
fundamental strategic factors that determine military success or
failure in this critical area of the world. The advantages of in
terior lines, mobility, and freedom of action that were enjoyed by
the ancient powers who were able to control and use the sea lanes
of the Mediterranean persist until this day.
In 525 B. C., Cambyses, the King of Persia, invaded and
subdued Egypt. Then he looked westward, toward Carthage, and
sent his army overland-across the Libyan Desert-to conquer
Carthage and add that nation to his empire. But the Phoenicians
-blood brothers to the Carthaginians-who controlled the sea,
and whom Cambyses could neither coerce nor intimidate, refused
to help him with their ships. Without a fleet for the support of
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his troops, Cambyses could not surmount his supply problem across
North Africa-and his army perished in the desert. Yet, in 1940,
the British, under General Wavell, in one of the most remarkable
military campaigns on record, moved across this same stretch of
North African coast to destroy an Italian army of more than 200,000 men. But the British right flank rested firmly on the free use
qf sea communications for the support of Wavell's tank columns
and tactical air.
Indeed, control of the Mediterranean littoral has traditionally
been achieved and maintained by those· belligerents who have first
made secure their communications by sea. Alexander the Great
recognized as· hopeless any attempt to conquer Egypt until he had
first disposed of the Phoenician navy which lay astride the supply
routes of his land armies. So, as a first step, Alexander, unlike
Cambyses, besieged Tyre, the principal Phoenician city, and re
duced it after a campaign of seven months. But by this operation,
Alexander removed the threat to his rear, and he obtained the cargo
shipping without which he could not move against Egypt. Na
poleon, on the other hand, did not percieve that sea power in the
eastern Mediterranean was indispensable to the success of his armies
on land. In his campaign to gain an eastern empire, Napoleon was
turned back at Acre by an inferior Turkish force supported from
seaward by a small squadron of British ships under Sir Sidney
Smith. During the preceding year, as you will recall, Nelson had
demolished the French fleet at the Battle of the Nile, and Napoleon
was without the means to sustain his communications in the face
of British command of the sea. This engagement marked the
collapse of his dream of an empire in the East. After his defeat
before Acre, Napoleon retired on his base in Egypt-baffled by
his inability to use the sea.
The principal states that have held maritime power in the
Mediterranean are Phoenicia, Carthage, the Greek States, Rome,
6
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Venice, Genoa, and Pisa. These States all have certain character
istics in common. Taken as a whole, they may probably be said to
comprise the identity of true maritime character. And it is well
to bear in mind that we are examining a period of more than 2,500
years. These States were invariably small in geographic extent.
They lacked natural resources and arable land. They bordered
on difficult terrain-mountains and deserts, or else the territory of
unfriendly people!:!. The inhabitants of the maritime States were
traders and craftsmen, rather than farmers or herdsmen. And
these States depended on the importation by sea of foodstuffs and
raw materials they were unable to produce at home. Like all other
true maritime powers, they derived a large part of their national
income from hauling the waterborne commerce of other nations
not inclined toward the sea. But their greatest source of wealth and
power grew out of their colonies, which they all sought to obtain
and exploit.
The earlier maritime powers of the Atlantic share these same
characteristics-Portugal and Holland, for example. Great Brit
ain falls into a somewhat special category, but only because of
her insularity, which underlines both her dependence on the sea
and the natural protection that it affords her. I would exclude
France and Spain from such a grouping, despite their extensive
maritime history, since they are primarily continental in charac
ter. But it is proper to add to the list of early maritime states
our own New England seaboard, as it existed from the beginning
of the Nineteenth Century until the Civil War, as this region ex
hibited so many of the features of maritime character.
As you well know, pre-eminence at sea has been distin
guished by the ownership of both combat and commercial fleets,
but it is well to hold in mind that combat fleets have been sub
ordinate in the order of national power to the commercial fleets
7
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they are designed to complement and to protect. The historian Gib
bon clearly sums up this relationship in writing of Venice at the
time of the Crusades: "Nor did she often forget that if armed gal
leys were the effect and safeguard, merchant vessels were the cause
and supply of her greatness."
The decline of sea powers cannot always be ascribed to any
immediate cause. In the history of nations that have risen to mari
time greatness and have lost it, there are deep and slowly moving
influences which I do not intend to examine here. But in the final
stages of the decay of sea power, there is one clear sign for all to
see: The merchant shipping of a declining sea power disappears
from the seas by reason of enemy action or withers it at home
through loss of profitable trade.
The Military Strategy of Great Britain

Let us now turn to Great Britain as the classic example of
national greatness resulting from sea power. An understanding
of the means Britain has employed to obtain and hold world power
will assist us in applying correctly our own maritime strength in
support of the national policy. It is not necessary to point out to
this audience the similarities between our maritime position and
that of Great Britain. It is, rather, the dissimilarities that must
be emphasized. Among these, the most important is our lack of de
pendence on the outside world for food. Of almost equal importance
is the self-contained nature of our economy. This is not to infer
that we do not draw from other parts of the world raw materials
we do not produce in adequate quantities at home, or that the
revenue we obtain from foreign trade does not form an important
part of our national income. It is simply that our economy is not
geared to a complex machinery of imports, exports, and all their
related maritime enterprises-as is Great Britain's. It has truly
been said that England must export or die. That statement could
8
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not apply to us whatever. And a final difference to be stressed is
that the United States-in addition to being a great sea power
is also a great land power, despite Mahan's thesis that no nation
could be both.
Britain has applied sea power with a skill that surpasses
all the other features of her foreign policy. King George V called
England's Fleet her "sure shield", as indeed it has been. Not since
William the Conqueror has Britain been invaded in war, although
there have been periods when invasion seemed imminent. And,
strange to say, there have always been Britons who feared invasion
at times such as these and have urged the erection of all sorts of
complicated land defenses to meet the enemy when he first stepped
on shore. When Napoleon stood on the Boulogne coast, with an

army of 130,000 men and a great assembly of transport and cargo
craft to ferry it. across the Channel, the Admiralty itself was ap

prehensive the invasion would succeed. But Lord St. Vincent
under whom the immortal Nelson learned his trade-knowing full
well the French would first have to dispose of the English Fleet
that lay in the Channel, reassured the Admiralty in a classic re
mark that seems worth repeating. "I do not say the French can
not come", he said, "I only say they cannot come by sea."
The strategy by which Britain has employed naval strength
to advance and protect the interests of her commercial fleets is
well known. Less widely recognized, perhaps, is somewhat the re

verse of this circumstance: whereby merchant shipping has been
a primary influence in shaping Britain's military strategy. In every
war, as you know, the readiness of a weapon for use exerts a con
trolling influence on the way the war is fought. In this sense,
merchant shipping has served Britain as a weapon.

The British have gained their most notable military suc
cesses when they have been able to employ land armies of relat-
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ively small size at critical points where control of the sea ap
proaches could be assured. By this strategy, Britain has been able
to minimize her lack of manpower and bring to bear against con
tinental opponents inconvenient or distracting pressure on flank or

rear, Such a strategy depends, of course, upon allies to engage the
enemy frontally if the war is to be fought to a conclusion. But it
has been the· preferred policy of Britain not to engage in land war
fare against a continental opponent unless assisted by a continental

ally. Merchant ships have provided the means by which this ec
centric form of strategy might be put to use. (And by eccentric, I
mean displaced from the center, rather than queer or odd.) Relat
ively small forces have been landed by transport and cargo shipping
at points remote from the main theater but which the enemy is com
pelled to defend if he is to remain secure all along his line.
This eccentric form of warfare is ideally exemplified by
Wellington's campaign in the Iberian Peninsula. Most of the na
tions of Europe were allied with England against Napoleon, and
the main theater of war was in mid-continent. Wellington used

the Fleet to transport his army to Portugal, where he entered
Europe, in the French rear. His army was relatively small but it
imposed an annoying division of force upon the French. Wellington
could not be ignored since he was stirring up so much trouble

with the Spaniards. The attempt to dislodge him in a series of
limited engagements was unsuccessful; and to have moved against
him in force-which Napoleon would have been compelled to do
meant transferring the main theater of war. In such a case,
Wellington would either have retired behind his prepared posi
tions at Torres Vedras or re-embarked his army into his trans
ports.

Thus Napoleon was confronted with what all continental

soldiers seek to avoid: a war on two fronts. When Wellington felt

that he was strong enough to move toward France, he used the

Fleet to transfer his base by easy stages along the Spanish coast-
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line. "If anyone", Wellington said, "wishes to know the history of
this war, I will tell them that it is our maritime superiority gives me
the power of maintaining my army, while the enemy are unable to
do so."
And yet, despite the maritime strategy that has been so well
suited to British arms, there is a perverse streak in British military
character which seeks the land battle of large proportions. Before
the outbreak of the first World War, there was a clear schism in
British military planning. The Admiralty group was all for em
ploying the small British Expeditionary Force in the event of war
in an eccentric move-an amphibious landing along the Pomer
anian coast, in the German rear, or along the Belgian coast, at
Ostend or Zebrtigge, on the flank. By this means, it was con
tended, far more pressure would be taken off the French than if the
British divisions were to take up a position on the left of the main
French line. The opposing group in the War Office favored the em
ployment of Britain's military effort in direct action against the
principal German armies. Sir Henry Wilson, then Director of
Military Operations, and an ardent Francophile, put over his plan
to get the British army of six divisions into alignment with the
French as soon after the outbreak of war as possible.
Now, if the British have a defect in their military make
up, it is their dogged persistence-once they are committed to a
line of action-in following it out to the bitter end. "Maintaining
the objective", they call it. The French recognize this. On one oc
casion, Wilson inquired of General Foch what would be the smallest
number of British troops that would be of any value to France in
the event of a war with Germany. "Send us one British soldier",
Foch replied, "and we shall take pains to see that he is killed !"
The result was, that instead of the modest army of six di
visions with which Britain had thought to assist France, she mobil-
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ized three and a half million men, of whom 700,000 were killed-a
disaster from which she has never recovered.
The Dardanelles campaign was the only operation of major
proportions undertaken by the Allies during World War I in which
this eccentric strategy was employed. Its objective was to turn the
left flank �f the Central Powers by knocking Turkey out of the war,

and thus to obtain access to eastern Europe as a means for sustain
ing Russia.

Notwithstanding its failure and the criticism which

has attended it, the Dardanelles campaign was soundly conceived.

It was a proper and logical use of the mobility afforded by trans

port type shipping to apply land pressure at a critical point the
enemy could not readily defend. This operation failed not so much

because of the brilliant defense put up by the German, Liman von

Sanders, but primarily because the British were unable to support
two offensives at the same time. Reinforcements that might have

turned the tide at Gallipoli were withheld until after the Loos of

fensive on the Western Front.

Can we perceive in all this a lesson for the United States?

Militarily, we possess the insular advantages of Great Britain but

we possess also her corresponding disadvantage of limited man

power in comparison with that of. our most likely continental ad
versary.

It is, of course, no part of my purpose to suggest for us

any basic plan for war, but it seems plain, if Britain is to be

taken as any sort of an example, that we cannot afford the head

long employment of great masses of troops in land warfare against
a continental opponent.

If this be so, and I think it is, then we

must-in the conservation of our national power-turn to an ec

centric-a maritime form of strategy-and exploit the advantages

of mobility, surprise, and economy of force that are conferred by
sea power-at the heart of which is merchant type shipping.
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Political and Economic Considerations
It was primary thesis of Admiral Mahan that for a nation
to be a great sea power it must conform to three requirements:
First, such a nation must have the means of production, and thus

be stimulated to the exchange of products. Second, it must have
shipping, whereby the exchange is carried on. And, third, it must
own colonies, which facilitate and enlarge the operations of shipping.
(Incidentally, our own lack of colonies led Mahan to question
whether the United States could ever become truly great at sea.)

Prior to World War II, this concept of sea power was well
supported in the history of maritime nations. You will observe,

however, that it is a concept that grows out of the colonial sys
tem and the doctrine of mercantilism. In the period before World
War I-in which Mahan wrote-the maritime powers were in con

stant struggle for individual advancement, and all of them owned
colonies. Under the system of mercantilism, a nation seeks to ob

tain the materials needed to support its economy from within its
own orbit and to export its production to others at a profit. Hence,
each of the maritime states required its own fleet of merchant

shipping, since none could depend upon its rivals to provide ships
at a time when not to provide them would weaken the relative
position of the other.
Taken on the whole, this theory of sea power was certainly
justified by world conditions prevailing until World War II. But, as

a result of that War, there have been profound changes in the mili
tary and economic workings of world politics which, in my opinion,
cause us to revise our earlier ideas of what is, and what is not, in the

national interest. The rise of international gangsterism and the to
talitarian state has forced peace-loving nations to look toward col
lective action as the best means of preserving their individual se
curity. In World War II, we used lend-lease to support nations
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whose interests were tied up with our own. At the present time, we
are endeavoring by means of E. C. A. to restore and sustain the

economic structure of the free nations of Europe. We believe
those nations must enjoy a reasonable degree of prosperity if they
are to be strong enough to withstand penetration by forces or ideol
ogies dangerous to ourselves. In order to do this, we are expending
-and we are committed to expend-a vast portion of our national
substance. Nobody knows what this program ultimately may cost.
But it is a program, nonetheless, around which our entire foreign
policy is centered.
This is a philosophy of world politics to which we as a na

tion have not heretofore subscribed. And it imposes upon us the
necessity to review some of the assumptions wh.ich have been funda
mental to our national thinking in the past. One of these is the as'."

sumption that the ownership of a large merchant marine is a
source of national power. Standing alone, this assumption is good,;
but it fails to take into account other, more potent, factors upon

which the national interest depends. As I see it, the question to be
decided is whether national support of an expanded U. S. merchant
fleet is in agreement with our larger policy of aid to Europe. If
not, then we must find a policy for the Merchant Marine that tends
to advance the program we are embarked upon in Europe at such
great cost arid risk to ourselves.

Since our immediate objectives in Europe are economic, let us

give some attention to the economics of world shipping.

It so happens that most of the nations to whom we are ex'."
tending assistance are maritime powers-Norway, Britain, The
Netherlands, and Greece, for example.

Or else they have large

maritime interests, such as France and Italy. The life of these na.:
tions to great extent depends on the sea. Before World War II, they
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shared-if we exclud� Japan---,-the.bulk of the carrying trade of the
world. The. transportation of ocean commerce is one of the prin
cipal services they sell to others. These countries haul freight
cheaply and efficiently. Moreover, they must have the income they
derive from this service if they are to maintain economic stability.
It affords their peoples a means of livelihood and provides them with
foreign exchange to buy the food and materials they cannot produce
at home. Today, the shipyards of Europe are striving to replace the
tonnage lost during the War, although the United States can sup
ply enough shipping for all the world's needs. These nations realize
intuitively they cannot turn their backs on the sea.
With this background, we may return to the proposition ad
vanced earlier in this discussion, namely, that the existence of a
large U.S. Merchant Marine would have jeopardized Allied chances
of winning World Wars I and II.
First, let us recognize that the total demands of world trade
will support a corresponding amount of world shipping. In other
words, the more trade, the more shipping in active employment.
But existing tonnage in excess of these requirements will either be
operated at a loss, or it will remain idle, since there will not be
enough trade to go round. Thus, at any given time, there is a pool
of world shipping that provides the means of ocean transportation
for world commerce. If the principles of economics are allowed to
operate freely, the size of this pool will be determined by the law
of supply and demand.Some nations will hold more of this shipping,
and others will hold less, depending upon their ability to compete in
the various world trades.
This was essentially the system that prevaiied prior to World
War I and II. Foreigners could operate ocean shipping more cheap
ly than we could; consequently, they carried the greater part of our
trade.
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Now, what happens when you tinker with this system?
What would have been the effect if, a few years prior to World War
I or II, we had, by means of subsidy, put an expanded U. S. mer
chant fleet into the pool of world shipping? The result, as you can

very well see, would have been to force certain of the other carrier
nations to cut down their merchant fleets to the level the remaining
trade would accommodate.

It is not hard to see which nations these would have been.
They would have been those nations whose costs of operation most
nearly approached our own-which means Britain, since she has less
of a margin, or cushion, to absorb the pressure of uneconomic com
petition from us. It is, of course, quite true that Britain's world
wide interests would have preserved for her a substantial merchant
fleet-still the largest in the world-but, nevertheless, competition
of the magnitude we are considering here would seriously have cut
into the tonnage that was available to Britain at the outbreak of both
World Wars.

There is good reason to believe the German U-Boat cam
paigns against British shipping in both World War I and II very

nearly succeeded. If the results of the first U-Boat campaign in
World War I be examined-and there were two separate campaigns
in that War-it will be observed that the British barely managed
to survive. With a smaller merchant fleet, there seems no doubt
Britain would have been starved into submission. The United
States was doing its best to remain neutral-not sending its ships
into the war zone, and so forth-but we had ocean freight backed
up on every railroad siding as far west as Chicago. The pressure
was on to do something for the Allies, and to get that freight mov
ing.

A larger U. S. Merchant Marine would have alleviated this

situation, and we would have been able to send our industrial and
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agricultural production throughout the rest of the world. Likewise,

a larger U.S. merchant tonnage would have increased the potential

hazard to Germany if the United States were drawn into the War;

and, with the correspondingly better prospects of success of its

U-Boat campaign against Britain, it seems quite likely the German

High Command would not have initiated the policy of indiscriminate
sinking that finally did bring us into the War.

The situation was very much the same in World War II.

Although Britain had a greater tonnage, she had military commit

ments that required merchant shipping on a far wider scale. Cargo

bottoms were a critical shortage for Britain throughout the War. Ac

cording to the British White Paper of November, 1944, Britain

started World War II with 17,500,000 gross tons of merchant ship
ping under her control. By the end of 1943, she had lost the as

tounding total of nearly twelve million gross tons!
,

It is not necessary for us to dwell on the probable results of

the elimination of Great Britain as an opponent to Germany in either

World War I or II. And I am well aware that the circumstances

which I have outlined and which might have forced her withdrawal
are entirely conjectural. But my point is this-we must not accept
blindly the statement that a large Merchant Marine is for the

United States an unfailing source of national power.

We share with Britain leadership in a world complex of sea

power that rings the continents of Europe and Asia like a girdle.

The members of that complex are mutually supporting. This align
ment of maritime strength provides individual states in the mari

time community with what is probably their most valuable single

means to withstand domination by land power. A proper policy for
the Merchant Marine will tend to preserve this alignment upon

which the maritime position of the United States ultimately depends.
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How can we go about doing this?
First, I should say we must estimate, as best we can, what
will be our requirements for merchant type shipping in the event of
war-not only for ourselves, but also for our prospective allies.
Then we must determine how these requirements may be satis
fied without adversely affecting our other vital interests not direct
ly related to shipping.
Allied needs for merchant shipping in time of war arrange
themselves naturally into two categories: the short-term needs
and the long-term needs. The pool of world shipping is one of the
principal sources from which this tonnage may be obtained-just
as it was in the last War and the War before that. Merchant ships
lose much of their nationality in time of war. Officers here can re
call convoys in the last War in which the flags of half a dozen
Allied nations were flown. In World War II, the merchant tonnage
available to all the Allies was drawn upon as a common fund
centrally disposed of and centrally directed. We may expect some
such procedure to be adopted in any future war.
If we define our short-term needs as those during the first
six months of a war, it will be safe to say they can be adequately
provided for from three already existing sources: (1) the tonnage
controlled by our prospective allies and friendly neutrals, (2) the re
serve fleets, which we must keep up-to-date and in good order, and
(3) the active U. S. Merchant Marine.
I will not touch further on the first two of these sources.
Nor will I discuss the merchant type tonnage available in the Mili
tary Sea Transport Service. But, as to the third of these sources of
short-term shipping, it is my opinion that we can maintain under
our Flag a fleet of merchant shipping which will take its proper place
in the world complex of maritime power-without weakening any
18
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of its members-and still give us a good nucleus for expansion in
time of war.

Briefly stated, such a fleet may be built around three pri
mary peacetime demands for shipping in the United States :

(1) Domestic shipping. Coastal and intercoastal shipping is flat on
its back. It has never returned to the level of activity it en
joyed prior to World Wars I and II. It must be restored if our
maritime potential is to be maintained. I would urge the extension
of subsidy or some other form of government assistance to this
type of shipping if for no other reason than it is an invaluable
source of seamen and of the miscellaneous smaller auxiliary craft
always so badly needed upon the outbreak of war. (2) The tonnage
we must operate on certain ocean routes to guarantee a continuing
supply of materials we do not produce at home-manganese, bauxite,
tin, and other minerals,-coffee and sugar, if you like. (3) The
tanker fleet. This, gentlemen, would be a considerable merchant
marine. It would by no means put us out of the shipping business,
and it would avoid cutting into the economic substance of our friends
in Europe.

Our long-term requirements for merchant type shipping are
more difficult to estimate. They will of course, be dictated by the
nature of the war on the military front and by the rate and de

gree of mobilization of all our other resources. Thus, it is clear we
will be granted time-within limits-to produce the additional ship
ping we may need, as our economy and manpower are more widely
mobilized. No one can say with certainty what our shipping re
quirements will be in the event of a long war, just as no one can
say where we shall be compelled to hold and where we may be able

to go forward, but it is prudent to assume that military operations

widely separated on the continents of Europe and Asia will have

to be supported, as will our own civilian economy and the civilian
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populations of certain of our allies. This bloc of shipping may sur
pass in tonnage all the Allied shipping of World War II.
But whatever these requirements may be, it must be em
phasized that we cannot hope to satisfy them unless we preserve
the shipbuilding industry in the United States. The know-how of
building ships is indispensable to sea power. It is at once an art

and a science, acquired patiently and painstakingly by those who
practice it. A competent force of designers and technicians upon
whom the industry may expand must be maintained in peace, if
the demands of war are to be met. In my opinion, a peacetime

Merchant Marine of the order I have described-coupled with our
naval building, the maintenance of the reserve fleets, and certainly
a program of "prototype-ship" construction-will provide us with
such a force and serve to keep the shipbuilding industry in a
healthy condition.

Gentlemen, I have by no means given you the entire picture
of the Merchant Marine. The Department of Logistics will under

take a detailed study of many aspects of this subject I have simply
touched upon; and Strategy & Tactics students will be afforded a
resume' of that study later in the year.
What I have tried to do here today is simply to give you
an insight into the relation between merchant shipping and national
power as it has existed in the past, and to provide, if possible, some

basis of policy for the treatment of other, smaller, maritime powers
upon whose continued well-being our own best interests depend.
With much of what I have said, you may not agree. In
deed, I should expect you to question critically many of the argu
ments I have put forward. But, as you spend more time here at the
War College, you will find-as I have-that one of its chief ob
jectives is

to encourage you

to think things out for yourself.

That is also the purpose of these remarks.
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